63, No. 3
We have the occupations and addresses of over 400 Dublin Fenians, most of whom were arrested in 1866 or detained by the authorities immediately after the rising. The Dublin organisation drew its members from all social grades, from labourers to law clerks, though artisans in particular were prominent in the organisation. Most of the Dublin Fenians lived in the west of the city, where traditional industries had developed, and where they formed their own communities. In other words, Fenianism appealed to certain areas in the city, where Fenians tended to live in close proximity to fellow Fenians.
Why did Fenianism appeal to the working class in Dublin? Irish nationalism can answer this question in a general way, but cannot explain the rapid spread of a large revolutionary movement among the city's working class in the 1860s. First Fenianism must be examined in terms of culture. It penetrated the social world of the lower class in Dublin, where social pressures left males who moved in a narrow world of work, pub and male companionship with little alternative to taking the Fenian oath. Secondly, this article deals with the economic background of Dublin Fenianism in the 1860s. Finally, attention is paid to social change, in particular the increase of literacy. These factors were closely interrelated.
However, in studies on banking history in the colonial Philippines, U.S. banks have not been called 'colonial banks'. This is probably because U.S. banks did not play an active role in the expansion of the economic interests of the United States in the Philippines. In fact, the colonial government promoted the development of banking activities to aid the expansion of export-oriented agriculture by local landlords. Thus, when analyzing the nature of banking activities in the Philippines during the period of American rule, it is important to clarify why the United States chose a banking policy which was favorable to the local elite.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of government banks in expanding the Philippine export economy while under American rule through examining the case of the Philippine National Bank. First, the act of 1916 which created the bank is examined and the importance of business related to agricultural loans in the act is discussed. This is followed by a survey of the way in which this business actually developed in the early stages of the bank's history. Finally, the problems related to agricultural loans between 1916 and 1918 are taken up to illustrate why the Philippine National Bank started to serve the interests of local landlords even though it had originally been designed to operate as a modern bank.
The second aim is to investigate the horse tramway that was constructed in Yamanashi on the basis of such desires and visions. I intend to clarify the promoters's initial 'visions' of regional traffic and the decision-making process, and then to focus on the actual management situation, the 'realities'. By contrasting visions with realities, it is possible to identify the nature of the visions of the people of the time.
My findings can be summarised as follows:
(1) Before the construction of the Chuo railway line, the people of Yamanashi prefecture urgently wanted to establish a means of transportation out of the prefecture in order to lower the transportation and transaction costs incurred in production and consumption. The horse tramway was constructed as the best alternative to a steam railway.
(2) Horse tramways did not require as much capital as steam railways. They were therefore very suited to regions with little accumulated capital
(3) Horse tramways were constructed on existing transport routes, which they supplemented and improved. In their visions, people of the time attached importance to existing routes.
After a period of trial and error, the Machikaisho took the advice of the Goyotashi and adopted two methods of purchasing rice. One was purchase from merchants by tender; the other was to receive supplies of rice paid as land tax by daimyo (feudal lords). However, the latter method had to be abandoned because of the problem of land-tax arrears. As a result, the Goyotashi became responsible for purchases, as part of their control of the price of rice. They were also obliged to renew the stored rice every few years.
However, because the rice stores were renewed as part of the system of price control, there was fear that the Goyotashi might seek to profit from the difference in the selling and purchasing price. The Shogunate was therefore afraid of being criticised for having links with them. However, in order to avoid the risk of the losses which would be caused by an unstable rice market, it was obliged to entrust the Goyotashi with full responsibility for the renewal of the rice stores. The inevitable effect of this was to give the Machikaisho the function of controlling the price of rice.