Socio-Economic History

Vol. 65, No. 3

Atsushi AOKI
The image of the regions of litigiousness: on legal culture and demographic movement of the eleventh through thirteenth century Chiang-hsih societies

From the eleventh to the thirteenth century Chiang-hsih, including the eastern part of Hunan, was famous both for its unique legal education, and for its litigiousness. MIYAZAKI Ichisada has attributed this to cultural influences, while OSAWA Masaaki points to the desire for money stimulated by movement of wealth. But this article demonstrates that there are many materials which show the importance of demographic movements.

Analysis of appropriate censuses shows that Chiang-hsih, Fukien, and Hunan exhibit the fastest population growth and that within Chiang-tong, Chian-hsih and Hunan, Jao, Chin, Yen are included in the areas of most rapid growth. These places are also famous for litigiousness. And in these places, there was an exceptional legalism, not rule by law, but something exceptional in traditional China, that embarrassed magistrates. Rapid population expansion and immigration into limited space caused rocketing land prices. People became willing to spend more money to obtain a piece of land, which was conceived by the mandarins as litigiousness. The collapse of the moral economy as a result of immigration may have increased the cost of land transactions, and encouraged people to seek solutions through lawsuits.

Local government and the managers of smaller enterprises in the 1920s and 1930s

The governing of urban economic activities in Japan started after World War I. It was the first time that a municipal government in Japan had adopted policies to support urban industries. However, since the main focus of the City of Tokyo in the 1920s was the protection of consumers, it is not really possible to talk of an actual industrial policy. It was not until the end of the 1920s, when steps were taken to relieve smaller retailers and manufacturers hit by the long recession, that an industrial policy worthy of the name began. After that, the need for an industrial policy was clearly recognized by the city authorities and new systems such as semi-official credit co-operatives, credit guarantee associations, and management consulting offices were established in Tokyo.

However, since the most important problem for national government during this period was rural poverty, urban relief policies had low priority, and the initiatives of municipal governments did not receive adequate support. With the introduction of a control economy in the late 1930s, smaller managers had to give up their businesses and turn to war production, so there was little justification for policies to support them.

Inman YEO
The rise and development of •three-wheel vehicleę manufacturing in inter-war Japan

Three-wheel vehicles, primarily used for transporting small goods, constituted the largest sector in the inter-war Japanese automobile industry. This article will examine the manufacturing of such vehicles from 1920 until 1937 through analysis of the factors of demand, technology and supply.

Since three-wheel vehicles cost only one-third of Ford's popular trucks, they could replace the traditional forms of transportation normally used by small businesses. Other factors which led to an expanding market in the 1930s were the fact that no driveręs licence was needed, the relatively low vehicle tax rate, and the narrowness of Japanese roads.

Technical assistance from the bicycle industry for the frame, and from the agricultural and fishing industries for the engine, made it possible to produce the three-wheel vehicle in Japan. The engine and other principal parts were imported in the 1920s, but Japanese products were able to compete with imports from the 1930s.

In the initial phase, the production and distribution of three-wheel vehicles were primarily controlled by bicycle parts manufacturers and motorcycle importers. In the 1930s, however, control shifted to relatively big concerns, such as Hatsudokiseizo (Daihatsu) and Toyokogyo (Mazda).

The monetary policy of the Bank deutscher L˙nder (Bank of German States) during Germany's postwar reconstruction (1948-1952)

A remarkable change occurred in the overall attitude of the Zentral-bankrat (Central Bank Council) during the period of postwar reconstruction, following the outbreak of the Korean War at the end of June 1950. The explosive expansion of the domestic market led to a heavy balance of payments deficit. In September of the same year, it was predicted that the German credit quota in the European Payments Union (EPU) would soon be exhausted. The EPU's Managing Board discussed the German deficits, and decided to send two experts to West Germany. The experts agreed to recommend special EPU credit and proposed a programme of credit restrictions together with continued trade liberalization. This recommendation was decisive for the Bank deutscher L˙nder, the predecessor of the Bundesbank. The Zentralbankrat decided with a small majority to raise the discount rate from 4 to 6 per cent.

The German balance of payments position improved dramatically in the spring of 1951. The restrictive monetary policy kept domestic demand at a low level and created pressure to export. This strategy was successfully practiced throughout the 1950s.