66, No. 4
(1) The gross migration rate of Yambe was relatively high, 46 per thousand per year. But in-migration and out-migration offset each other, and thus net migration made very little impact on the village population.
(2) Marriage and employment as servants (hoko) were the dominant reasons for migration. Both reveal distinct patterns as do the movements of males and females.
(3) The number of migrants declined precipitously after about 1840, because servants (hoko-nin) were replaced by day laborers (hiyatoi).
(4) The age profile of migration showed a sharp peak from the upper teens to the lower twenties, because marriage and hoko were concentrated in these age groups. The male profile peaked at a higher age than the female profile.
(5) The average distance of migration was 4 km, and almost all migration took place within a radius of 10 km from Yambe. Villagers tended to migrate farther away for marriage than for hoko.
Soon, however, its production rate of crude oil began to reach a ceiling, signalling that its growth strategy was coming to an end. However, the company continued to pursue the strategy of mergers, expansion and capital increase, until in 1909 the discovery of falsified accounts brought disaster.
The next year saw the beginning of reforms known as naibu seiri. Professional managers were introduced and, most important, the growth strategy was changed to one based on gradual advances through technical innovations in mining.
First, I analyze interactions between a group of car assemblers (the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association) and a group of major suppliers (the Japan Auto Parts Industries Association). Second, I examine smaller suppliers' relations with their buyers, based on the results of a survey which I carried out in the Keihin district.
While the subcontractor system in Japan has been reinforced since the 1960s, various problems have also emerged during the process. Although the solutions to the problems differ from one tier of the system to another, they reflect the collective interests and activities of the suppliers in each tier.
Earlier studies have concluded that the attempt to transplant the cotton itself was unsuccessful as well as the project as a whole, mainly because of 'the dominance of small-scale farming' in Japan or the 'backwardness' of Japanese agriculture. However, since there is evidence that in some areas farmers actually succeeded in rearing American cotton, the 'supply side' cannot have been the decisive factor.
This paper takes into account the 'demand side', focusing on how American cotton was handled by cotton growers and processors. There was a deep concern on the part of the growers that the raw cotton would not sell unless the government was willing to buy it up. At the same time, the processors complained that long stapled American cotton was unsuited to processing machines built for the short stapled Japanese variety. Thus, the major cause of the failure was that American cotton was unable to find a market in Japan at the time.
After entering the Korean War, China made a drastic move away from 'neo-democratic' policies and started to exercise control over economic activities. In the middle of 1951, the Communist Party started 'the Movement against Three and Five Evils' and 'the Democratic Reform Movement', which took a similar form as the land reforms in targeting the bourgeoisie. Through these political movements, many major private enterprises were converted to semi-governmental corporations, and as a result, the Communist Party established a dominating role in the economy. As there was little difference between semi-governmental and state-run corporations, we can say that the China's transformation into a socialist state really began in 1951, and that the Korean War acted as the turning point.