Vol.
68, No. 4
![](../../../jp/image/LGreen2.gif)
Michio HAMADA
Poaching and seigneurial justice in eighteenth century Beaujolais: the
jurisdiction of Saint-Lager and its environs
![](../../../jp/image/LGreen.gif)
In the France of the Old Regime, the monarchy gave the nobility the
exclusive privilege of hunting and bearing arms; the commoners, especially
the peasants, opposed this monopoly by poaching. The object of this
paper is to examine the nature of seigneurial authority through investigating
the repression of poaching in several jurisdictions.
The poachers who appear in
the criminal records tend to be fairly rich peasants (or their sons
and young servants) using guns, which circulated among peasants in the
countryside through both purchase and loans. This shows that hunting
was rather commonplace as a leisure pursuit, although only a few records
of proceedings against poaching can be found (only twenty-five in five
jurisdictions throughout the eighteenth century).
But why are there so few
records of proceedings? First, it was because le garde de chasse (the
rural police) were recruited from among the peasants and often chose
not to pursue poachers; and second, because the seigneurial prosecutor
proceeded principally against habitual poachers. There was certainly
a threshold of tolerance in the seigneurial justice system. Thus the
system served to mediate between the monarch, who needed to maintain
order, and the peasants, who had been accustomed to hunting since the
middle ages.
![](../../../jp/image/bbacke.gif)
![](../../../jp/image/LGreen2.gif)
Takeshi NAGASHIMA
Public health administration in late-nineteenth century England, with
special reference to the activities of Brighton Sanitary Authority
![](../../../jp/image/LGreen.gif)
It is well-known that, in the mid-nineteenth century, such distinguished
central officials as Edwin CHADWICK and John SIMON struggled for public
health reform. Then, what happened from the 1870s, after these heroic
reformers had disappeared from the forefront of central health administration?
The late-nineteenth century
was the period when the locus of public health reform shifted from central
to local government. By the provisions of the Public Health Acts of
the 1870s, local councils were designated as 'sanitary authorities'
and assigned to deal with public health problems, by employing Medical
Officers of Health.
This article examines the
case of Brighton. Particular attention is paid to the way in which the
scope of public health administration was decided through interactions
between Brighton Town Council and Arthur NEWSHOLME, its Medical Officer.
Under NEWSHOLME's guidance, Brighton Town Council developed systems
for dealing with several varieties of patients, not only those with
acute infections but also unhealthy children and sufferers from pulmonary
tuberculosis. Thus, the scope of public health administration in Brighton
was no longer confined, as it had been, to improvement of the town's
general sanitary environment, but extended into the sphere of personal
service provision.
![](../../../jp/image/bbacke.gif)
![](../../../jp/image/LGreen2.gif)
Makoto KISHIDA
The city of Tokyo foreign loan negotiations and the external financial
policy of the Kenseikai government, 1924~1927
![](../../../jp/image/LGreen.gif)
This article explores the foreign loan negotiations of the city of Tokyo
in both Britain and America and reconsiders Japan's external financial
policy in the mid-1920s in this context. After World War I, controls
on the issuing of foreign loans in Britain, and the consequent convergence
on America as a source of finance, made it difficult for foreign countries
to raise loans abroad. The municipalities of Tokyo and Yokohama sought
loans to fund reconstruction works after the Great Kanto Earthquake
of 1923. But the high interest rate on new issues charged by both the
British and U.S. markets, together with fear of the domestic public
censure which this might produce, prevented the government from proceeding
with the negotiations.
The prolonging of the negotiations
had an effect on Japan's financial policy. In September 1925, the Kenseikai
government decided to raise the fallen exchange rate toward par and
to reinforce overseas specie holdings, both in preparation for the return
to the gold standard. The Tokyo loan negotiations were re-opened as
an important potential source of specie. But the postponement of the
negotiations in February 1926 interrupted the plans for a return to
gold. This article therefore concludes that Japanese financial policy
was affected not only by the internal political and economic situation,
but also by conditions in international capital markets.
![](../../../jp/image/bbacke.gif)
![](../../../jp/image/LGreen2.gif)
<Conference report>
Etsuo ABE
The great depression and the transformation of financial systems: the
beginning of regulation in the interwar period
![](../../../jp/image/LGreen.gif)
Over the last decade, it has
been said that deregulation and the transformation of the financial
system are key issues for the revitalization of the Japanese economy.
But when, how, and why, did the regulations which are in operation today
begin? The answers to these questions should help us to understand the
meaning and potential results of deregulation now.
This was the topic selected
as the common theme of the sixty-ninth annual conference of the Socio-economic
History Society. We examined the beginning of regulation in five countries
(the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan)
during the interwar period, with special reference to the relationship
with what is known as the great depression.
The following conclusions
were drawn about the U.S., Germany and Japan, which all experienced
severe economic and financial difficulties: In the U.S., regulation
was uniform and transparent. In Germany and Japan, however, administrative
control of financial affairs was strengthened, and the role of the government
in the economy grew. In France and the U.K., however, the financial
crisis was less severe, with the collapse of some banks in the former,
but none in the latter. This was not so much the result of a skillful
response from the central banks and governments of the two countries,
but because of historical differences in their financial structure.
![](../../../jp/image/bbacke.gif)