Vol. 79, No. 3

Kaoru SUGIHARA, Patterns and development of world trade in the “long nineteenth century”

This paper discusses patterns and development of world trade from the end of the eighteenth century to the outbreak of World War I. It reconstructs the total value of world export trade in 1840 using statistics in British Parliamentary Papers and existing literature, and argues that current statistical knowledge captures both long-distance trade and intra-European trade, but misses most of intra-regional (especially intra-Asian) trade. The paper compares this observation with the 1910 data, and suggests that growth of world trade in the long nineteenth century entailed a shift in the centre of industrial production from Asia to Europe, and the subsequent reorganisation of Asian economies under a “forced free trade” regime. While parts of the non-European world became satellites of the world economy, the decline of traditional industries in Asia was accompanied by the resurgence of intra-Asian trade, allowing Asia to emerge as a region with its own international division of labour. Low tariff rates in Asia often meant a faster per capita growth of trade than in the industrializing countries of Continental Europe and the United States with protectionist tendencies. As a result, the regional composition of world trade remained stable, in spite of the fact that it was driven by the West-centred industrialization and long-distance trade.

Minling LIANG, The "urban defense forces" and a walled city of the Qing: focusing on the case of Guangzhou

This article examines the “urban defense forces” that defended cities and maintained security within the walls through a case study of Guangzhou during the Qing. It explores the functions of the city garrison under imperial rule. In imperial China walled cities served as administrative centers where defense facilities and garrisons were deployed to protect the city on a regular basis. The city of Guangzhou was garrisoned by both the banners and the Green Standard Army, each responsible for designated districts. The Green Standard Army consisted of fubiao commanded by the Governor, junbiao commanded by the Banner General, and chengshouxie who were assigned to most walled cities. These forces co-existed in the same urban community through mutual surveillance and cooperation within a hierarchical system. This article argues that the “urban defense force” was a loose integration of different garrisons interwoven with imperial authorities and institutions, rather than a highly organized and systematic structure. The system had a high level of flexibility as can be seen by the adjustments it made to meet challenges during the long era of peace under the Qing. As a result, the role of the banners gradually shifted from pillars of the urban defense system into a symbol of the Manchus’ political rule.

Hikaru TANAKA, The development of the Japanese Ministry of Finance Savings Deposit Fund management system for local re-allocation during the interwar period: a case study of the 1927 Nagano Prefecture relief loans for severe frost damage

The Japanese economy went through extreme difficulties in the interwar period. As rural areas in particular were gravely affected, the Ministry of Finance Savings Deposit Fund (MoF-SDF) and its financial network tried to aid local businesses in crisis times. The 1927 relief loan by MoF-SDF was a benchmark cases for developing the financial network's core mission.
Operation of the MoF-SDF (which largely consisted of Postal Savings Deposits) was in the hands of the Ministry of Finance. Basic operation rules for local re-allocation of MoF-SDF were first determined in 1909. After that, strong bonds were developed between MoF-SDF, Japan Kangyo Bank, Agro-industrial local banks and cooperatives. This financial network was already established before the interwar period. The re-allocation system which was mainly aimed at supporting recovery from natural disasters, also promoted local economic development. In 1925, MoF-SDF was legally reformed, but the reform did not fundamentally alter the re-allocation management system. When severe and wide frost damage occurred in Nagano prefecture during the Japanese Financial Crisis in 1927, MoF-SDF took the lead in supplying a huge relief loan. This loan contributed to the development of the financial network, increasing its socio-economic power in rural society.

Hiroaki MOROTA, Money supply mechanisms and modernization of the Tianjin financial market from the 1920’s to the 1930’s

A stable money supply was maintained in 1920’s Tianjin, using arbitrage of silver supply and demand based on several kinds of short term interest rates in Tianjin and Shanghai. However, in the early 1930’s instability in the Tianjin financial market led to calls for reform. Instability was the result of the disconnection between Tianjin and Shanghai following the 1932 Shanghai incident, and the foreign banks’ refusal to accept silver coins owing to the excess of silver coins in Tianjin. In October 1932, the association of bankers and money shops in Tianjin established a Bankers and Money Shops Joint Treasury (BMJT). The BMJT absorbed excess silver coins and stabilized the Tianjin financial market by acting as a clearinghouse, public foundation, and exchange market between Tianjin and Shanghai, thus strengthening the connection to Shanghai. The Tianjin financial market became more efficient and stable as a result of the activities of the BMJT, which—owing to differences of clearing customs in Tianjin and Shanghai—was founded earlier than a similar organization in Shanghai. This shows that financial modernization in the 1930’s was not limited to comprehensive legal measures that assumed a single system with Shanghai as its center, but could also be advanced by the creation of infrastructure linking other regional systems.

Yuko KUDO, Business transactions conducted by Dutch banks with Chinese merchants in the Dutch East Indies: Javanese sugar transactions and the sugar crisis of 1917

This article aims to verify the relationship between Chinese merchants and Dutch banks from the viewpoint of financing by focusing on transactions for sugar, which was a principal export product of the Dutch East Indies. Specifically, the following points are clarified in terms of how the sugar crisis of 1917 changed the sugar sales system until the exporting peak in the 1920s.
Before the crisis, the relationship between Dutch banks and Chinese merchants was an interdependent one in which the provision of purchase funds using sugar as collateral, helped to ensure sales destinations. When World War I began, speculation by Chinese merchants intensified in response to an inflow of large amounts of capital from the banks. However, after the sugar crisis in 1917, the Dutch banks formed a cartel to unify sugar sales, giving priority to Japanese and European corporations, while financing for Chinese merchants was reduced. Under this new sales system, the Chinese merchants were polarized into two groups: influential merchants with personal funds who had experience in overseas sales, and small- to medium-sized merchants. At this time the Dutch banks changed their relationships with Chinese merchants; they began to select clients and carried out indirect transactions through Chinese banks.

Isamu MITSUZONO, Income structure of small-scale retailers in the early Showa era: focusing on the additional income derived from non-retail business

This paper considers the “problem of the small retailers” in the early Showa era through an examination of the structure of their income. It was commonly argued that small-scale retailers suffered from a slump in retail business and lived in dire poverty. However, this study shows that although many small-scale retailers only derived low income from their retail business, about half of them gained additional income from other sources. The most common additional source of income was from asset income, which was common among retailers whose retail business was relatively large scale and long-lived. The asset income allowed them to cut their short-term profit in the retail business, creating a rough competitive environment for newcomers who wanted to enter the trade. Retailers whose businesses were relatively small scale and short-lived, also earned income from non-retail work, but the additional work seems to have harmed their retail business performance. Therefore, we can say that income was not only a consequence but also a cause of the social “problem of the small-scale retailers.”